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In Response ...
JOHNY. SIMON'-

In urging us to rethink the issue of federal financial
support for historical editing down to the fundamental
level of what deserves this support and why, Ms. Reagor
has done us all a favor. The National Historical Publications and Records Commission has a long prehistory dating back to the seminal thought of J. Franklin Jameson;
a period of good intentions and inactivity (1934-50); the
age of Jefferson-or of Julian P. Boyd-(1950-64); expanded powers with the addition of grant funding (196475); and finally, a bifurcated role with the addition of a
records program to its initial mandate. Throughout,
there has been an evolving sense of mission, shifts in
peripheral concern, and, ultimately, a program of sponsorship and funding based more upon reaction to proposals than upon an initial set of goals.
What Reagor regards as weakness, however, might as
fairly be seen as strength. Within the family of long-term
sponsored and funded projects, many were founded before the commission had grantfunds, and none are totally
dependent upon this agency for support; each project
represents both a decision by the commission to'sponsor
or support and a decision by other agencies, institutions,
or other sources of funding to provide continuing support. In this dimension, one can argue that each project
has passed at least two tests: that of the host institution
and that of the commission.
One can sympathize with Reagor's desire to set clear
guidelines for commission sponsorship and support
without fully agreeing with it. The most sensible and
practical guidelines may be violated not by willful editors
or bureaucrats but by unruly documents. For example,
a recent commission-sponsored publication, Mary Chesnut's Civil War, edited by C. Vann Woodward, violates
every standard suggested by Reagor-and perhaps others
she might wish to add. The document itself emanates not
from the federal government but from a hostile government: the Confederate States of America. The author is
no government official recording policy, but a woman reporting what archives would ignore. Editing and publishing the document serves no conceivable federal purpose
except the very broadest and most valuable: informing
the American people about their heritage. Finally, its appearance provoked-perhaps deliberately-debate over
the authenticity of the document itself and its reliability
as a historical source.
Let me assure you of my opinion that commission
" John Y. Simon is executive director of the Ulysses S. Grant
Association.

sponsorhip of Mary Chesnut was no mistake. For three
quarters of a century a flawed text of this document
formed an essential element in the historical understanding of the South, the Confederate government, the history of women, and more. Historians who used the
Diary from Dixie-the title given two flawed editionspersistently and unavoidably misunderstood the nature
and purpose of this document. Woodward revealed that
the document existed on three levels: as a diary kept at
the time (and now largely lost), as an abortive effort in
the 1870s to create a work of art based on the original
diary, and as another effort at ltterary composition in the
1880s. By choosing to publish the final version (incorporating some excised material from the original diary),
Woodward faced criticism that he had published a document that was a hoax and that he could have served historians better by publishing only every word of the remnants of the original diary. Whether such criticism is
well-founded or not, we need to focus on the main point:
every historian henceforward who uses Mary Chesnut
will know what is being used and what degree of truth is
conveyed.
The Booker T. Washington Papers, a more traditional
commission project now nearing a triumphant conclusion, also illustrates this point. Precisely because
Washington (like almost all of his correspondents) was
excluded from a major role in the formulation of government policy, his papers have an unusual claim on our attention if we are to arrive at an understanding of the
American past. We could not possibly claim that these
documents are any less significant in forming current federal policy than those generated by people more politically powerful in their own day. Furthermore, the
Washington papers share with the Chesnut diary the
quality of surprising as well as enlightening scholars. The
Washington edition has presented a more complex man
dealing in a more sophisticated way with the issues of his
time than heretofore portra)'Cd by his biographers, and
has also illuminated his correspondents. This is not to say
that the biographers were lax or unperceptive; documen- ,
tary editing furnishes a perspective unavailable else-·
where. It is not a mechanical substitute for biography but
an independent form of historical presentation with
values beyond the biographical.
If we lived in an ideal nation, our political leaders
would also be our wisest thinkers and ablest writers. Of
course this is not the case, and many vanished statesmen
are best memorialized by statues and uncommon denominations of postage stamps. In the end, we may find
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that any clear formula for determining what papers
should be edited will exclude those very papers which
would prove most productive while encouraging with
funding opportunities those enterprises which meet the
formula but not the needs of scholarship.
In the past, the commission has chosen to sponsor and
support editing projects based upon conceptions of what
would most benefit a broad community of scholars and,
through their use of documents, the American people
generally. These judgments have not been beyond criticism, but based, as they are, upon the individual judgments of representatives of leading historical organizations, it is difficult to see how they might be improved
by transferring these powers to bureaucratic channels.
Could we realistically expect government officials to request documentary compilations which might take fifty
years and more to complete? And would they be able to
certify that such studies when completed would assist in
formulating policy? Of the risks enumerated in the paper,
that American history is a "narrow field," that projects
may be developed just because money is available, and
that the government may exercise too much influence
over the editing, not one has been confirmed by the experience of the commission since 1964. Narrowness,
boondoggling, and tendentiousness are far more likely
dangers in a program conceived to fulfill "in-house"
needs.
By calling for redirection of the commission to meet
the policy needs of the federal government, Reagor overlooks the existence of a corps of federal historians already
fulfilling this need. The departments of State, Defense,
and Interior (and there are others) have substantial numbers of historians ready and able to serve them. These historians can perform more ably than historians from
academia since they possess special access to internal materials, no small matter when security clearance and declassification are considered. And even historians within
the government are forced to look beyond documents in
federal custody for documentary compilations. The National Archives employs a microfilm program to disseminate records in its custody; almost any worthwhile editing project based upon such records (like the Territorial
Papers) would be flawed by exclusive reliance on any
single body or class of documents. Sometimes the distinction between editing by federal historians and the editing
by commission projects blurs to the point of disappearance. But it should not be forgotten that work sponsored
by the commission is invariably less burdensome to taxpayers and that the commission has scored success after
success in making accessible documents vital to an understanding of the American past.
During the past decade, as opportunities for historians
to find employment or grant funding have declined, the
result has been increasing pressure upon the commission
to redirect its efforts toward some innovative, expanded,
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and ever more secure role within the federal government.
Perhaps eventually this pressure may lead either to the
destruction of the commission as it now exists or to a
drastic change in its mission and mandate. Undesirable as
this is, it may be inevitable. The most regrettable conceivable outcome, in my opinion, would be the redirection
outlined by Reagor toward unnecessary duplication of
historical work already underway in federal agencies.
Reagor's point about duplication of programs between
NEH and NHPRC deserves attention. For historical
editors, the chance of funding from one or another
agency is good news, with any proposal having two
chances for success. In recent years, the commission has
shifted emphasis from long-term, multivolume, comprehensive editions to short-term selective editions buttressed by microform supplements to provide the entire
corpus. In so doing, the commission has moved closer to
the standards of the NEH, discouraging undertakings of
the sort which have made the commission a government
success story. The duplication noted by Reagor might
well suggest that the commission would profit by moving
in the opposite direction: by reaffirming sponsorship of
projects so monumental in size and scope, so difficult to
complete, that no other federal agency would care to
make the commitment. When President Truman saw the
first volume of The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, he instinctively answered the question asked by Reagor:
"What is appropriate for Federal support?" Perhaps this
is the fundamental principle which the commission
should adopt.

Interpretation in Editing
Passage from a letter of J ames Monroe to Thomas J efferson dated 9 August 1784, describing a proposed trip
to the frontier, as edited by Julian P. Boyd (Papers of
ThomasJefferson,7:392).
I will certainly see all that my time will admit of. It
is possible I may lose my scalp from the temper of
the Indians, but if either a little fighting or great deal
of ruseing 1 will save it [I] shall escape safe.
1 Monroe, Writings, ed. Hamilton, 1, p. 38-9, gives
this almost illegible word as "running," which
would be plausible were it not for the fact that such
a reading imputes a greater degree of humor to Monroe than his letters usually displayed. The reading
given above, a misspelling of an obsolete verb ruse,
meaning to retreat, dodge, or detour, seems to fit
both Monroe and the scrawl better.
-BRENT TARTER

